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Generally, in emergency situations, medical treatment and surgical 
operations may be undertaken without consent – provided they 
are not against the expressed wishes of the patient.[1] In the case of 
children facing medical emergencies, special procedures are provided 
for in the Children’s Act No. 38 of 2005.[1] The Act provides that the 
superintendent of a hospital, or the person in charge of the hospital 
in their absence, may consent to the medical treatment or surgical 
operation on a child if (i) the treatment or operation is necessary to 
preserve the life of the child or to save the child from serious lasting 
physical injury or disability, and (ii) the need for treatment or an 
operation is so urgent that it cannot be deferred for the purpose 
of obtaining the consent that would otherwise be required.Where 
an urgent caesarian section has to be performed on a pregnant 
child, and there is no time to comply with these provisions, some 
doctors have relied on the child’s consent alone by applying the third 
trimester provisions of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 
No. 92 of 1996 (CTOP)[3] (Dr Neil F Moran, personal communication). 
In light of the above, the Head of Clinical Department: Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology, Department of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, has recently raised 
the question of whether the consent provisions in the CTOP may be used 
for live births by caesarian section on children in emergency situations 
(Dr Neil F Moran, personal communication). When interpreting a statute 
a judge will not simply rely on the grammatical meaning of the words 
in the text. The judge will consider them in the context of the Act, and 
try to interpret the Act in line with what they regard as the purpose of 
the legislation and in favour of the persons the Act seeks to protect, as 
demonstrated in the purpose of, or preamble to, a statute.[4]
To answer the question as to whether the consent provisions of 
the CTOP can also be used for live births, it is necessary to consider 
(i) the definition of ‘termination of pregnancy’ in the CTOP; (ii) the 
purpose of the CTOP; (iii) the definition of ‘abortion’ in the Abortion 
and Sterilization Act No. 2 of 1975 (Abortion Act),[5] which the CTOP 
repealed because it was too restrictive; and (iv) whether the consent 
provisions in the CTOP may be used for live births by caesarian 
section on children. If the CTOP is used, the consent provisions in the 
Children’s Act or any other law do not apply.[3]
Meaning of ‘termination of pregnancy’ in 
the CTOP
The ordinary dictionary meaning of ‘termination’ is to ‘end’ something, 
although the dictionary states that the secondary meaning of 
‘termination’ in the context of ‘termination of pregnancy’ is ‘an 
abortion’.[6] In order to determine the meaning intended by the CTOP, 
it is necessary to consider the definition provided in the Act. The Act 
defines ‘termination of pregnancy’ as ‘the separation and expulsion, 
by medical or surgical means, of the contents of the uterus of a 
pregnant woman’.[3] This is a much wider definition than that used, for 
instance, in Rhode Island in the USA, which makes it clear that it refers 
to abortion by stating that ‘termination of pregnancy … shall mean 
administering to a woman any medicine, drug, substance, or thing 
whatever, or the employment upon her of any instrument or other 
means whatever, with intent to procure or induce the miscarriage 
of such woman’.[7] Zambia has a Termination of Pregnancy Act that 
does not define ‘termination of pregnancy’, but instead refers directly 
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to ‘abortion’ throughout the Act.[8] Zimbabwe also has a Termination 
of Pregnancy Act in which it is stated that the purpose is to ‘change 
the law relating to abortion by defining the circumstances in which 
a pregnancy may be terminated’.[9] The Act goes on to state that: 
‘Any reference in this Act to the termination of a pregnancy shall be 
construed as meaning the termination of a pregnancy otherwise than 
with the intention of delivering a live child’.[9] 
In the South African CTOP, the term ‘contents of the uterus’ 
clearly refers to the fetus. However, the Act begs the question as 
to whether a caesarian section that involves the removal of a live 
fetus from the mother’s uterus, amounts to ‘the separation and 
expulsion, by … surgical means, of the contents of the uterus of a 
pregnant woman’.[3] The answer must be in the affirmative, because 
a caesarian section is a surgical procedure which separates and 
expels the fetus from its mother’s uterus. A caesarian section that 
separates a live fetus from its mother’s uterus satisfies the wide 
definition of ‘termination of pregnancy’ in the CTOP. As the CTOP 
allows terminations of pregnancy in the third trimester, where the 
fetus is viable, and the continued pregnancy will ‘endanger the 
woman’s life’ or would ‘pose a risk of injury to the fetus’,[3] it can be 
argued that such a caesarian section would be lawful if undertaken 
in terms of the Act. This is because if surgical terminations may be 
undertaken for abortions after the 20th week of gestation, there is 
no reason in principle why the provisions of the CTOP may not also 
be used for live births after the 20th week – in situations where the 
mother’s life is endangered or there is a risk of injury to the fetus. 
Where they are applicable, the relevant parts of the Act could be 
interpreted to apply to both abortions and live births.
Purpose of the CTOP
The argument that the CTOP may also apply to live births when the 
termination is undertaken in the third trimester is also strengthened 
by the stated purpose of the Act in the Preamble.[3] This is stated to 
be that Parliament recognises, inter alia, that ‘women have the right 
of access to appropriate healthcare services to ensure safe pregnancy 
and childbirth’.[3] This statement seems to indicate that the Act is not 
only aimed at terminating pregnancies in the context of abortions, 
but also at ensuring that women have access to proper health 
services so that they can have safe pregnancies and childbirth. On 
this interpretation, a caesarian section that needs to be undertaken 
in emergency situations, to save the life of the mother or a fetus in 
situations where the child mother wishes to have the baby, clearly 
falls into the category of ‘a safe pregnancy and childbirth’.
In addition, the Preamble states that the Act ‘repeals the restrictive 
and inaccessible provisions of the Abortion and Sterilization Act … 
and promotes reproductive rights and extends freedom of choice by 
affording every woman the right to choose whether to have an early, 
safe and legal termination according to her individual beliefs’.[3] Once 
again, where in an emergency situation a caesarian section has to be 
performed on a pregnant child mother, to save her life and comply with 
her wish to save her unborn child from injury, this can be construed 
as the mother exercising her ‘right to have an early, safe and legal 
termination’. 
Definition of ‘abortion’ in the Abortion Act
The Abortion Act defined an ‘abortion’ as ‘the abortion of a live fetus 
of a woman with intent to kill such fetus’.[7] The emphasis on the 
killing of a fetus is consistent with the definition of terminations of 
pregnancy in Rhode Island, where reference is made to procuring or 
inducing miscarriages in pregnant women;[7] in Zambia, where direct 
reference is made to abortions in their Termination of Pregnancy 
Act;[8] and in Zimbabwe, where terminations of pregnancy are those 
that are undertaken ‘otherwise than with the intention of delivering 
a live child’.[9]
As previously mentioned, the CTOP is aimed at overcoming the 
‘restrictive’ provisions of the Abortion Act – and it can be argued that 
the very narrow definition of abortion in the Abortion Act is one of 
the ‘restrictive’ provisions that the CTOP was designed to eliminate. 
There is no mention of ‘procuring an abortion’,[8] or ‘to procure or 
induce a miscarriage’,[7] or undertaking a procedure ‘otherwise than 
with the intention of delivering a live child’[9] in the definition of 
‘termination of pregnancy’ in the CTOP. The CTOP does not narrow 
the definition of termination of pregnancy, and in the context of the 
Act as a whole, there is no provision that indicates that the Act only 
applies to abortions. Some provisions may not be relevant to live 
births, such as those dealing with terminating pregnancies during the 
first and second trimesters when a fetus is not viable, but this does 
not mean that the provisions for the third trimester should only apply 
to abortions if they are broad enough to apply to live births.
Can the consent provisions in the CTOP 
be used for live births by caesarian 
section on children?
The CTOP states that a termination of pregnancy may only be 
undertaken with the consent of the pregnant person. In the case 
of children, they should be advised to consult with their parents, 
guardian, family members or friends before their pregnancy is 
terminated, but if they choose not to, the termination of pregnancy 
‘shall not be denied’.[3] Furthermore, the consent provisions in the 
CTOP apply ‘notwithstanding any other law or the common law’,[3] 
which means that the provisions of the Children’s Act dealing with 
consent by children in the case of surgical procedures, where they 
require assistance from their parent or guardian, do not apply.
Although not yet decided by the courts, it is submitted that the 
wording in the CTOP can be interpreted to also apply to live births 
because (i) the definition of ‘termination of pregnancy’ in the Act is 
wide enough to apply to both abortions and live births in the third 
trimester, and (ii) the purpose of the Act is, inter alia, to ensure ‘safe 
pregnancy and childbirth’ and to allow women to choose to have ‘an 
early, safe and legal termination’.[3] A caesarian section is a surgical 
method of terminating a pregnancy as it expels and removes a fetus 
from its mother’s uterus, as provided for in the Act. It can be argued, 
therefore, that in the third trimester, when the fetus is viable, a 
pregnant child may alone consent to a termination of pregnancy by 
caesarian section to deliver a live baby, in order to save her own life 
or to prevent the fetus from suffering the risk of injury, as provided for 
in the Act. If this interpretation is correct, then it would apply whether 
or not the doctors involved were faced with an emergency situation, 
as they would not be bound by the provisions of the Children’s Act.[3] 
It is submitted that the ordinary meaning of the words ‘termination 
of pregnancy’ as defined in the CTOP are broad enough to encompass 
terminations through caesarian section in the third trimester for 
the reasons set out above. Should the legislators wish the CTOP 
to apply only to abortions in the third trimester, they should limit 
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the definition of terminations of pregnancy to those specifically 
undertaken to ‘procure an abortion’;[8] to ‘kill a fetus’;[5] to terminate 
a pregnancy ‘otherwise than with the intention of delivering a live 
child’;[10] or to ‘procure or induce a miscarriage’.[7] Until the courts or 
Parliament decide otherwise, it can be argued that doctors are fully 
justified in relying on the consent of the child alone in terms of the 
CTOP, when conducting caesarian sections for live births during the 
third trimester, where they are done to save the mother’s life or to 
prevent the fetus from suffering a risk of injury.
Whatever Parliament or the courts decide, doctors can always fall 
back on the ‘best interests of the child’ principle in the Constitution,[10] 
using the provisions in the CTOP and the standards mentioned in the 
Children’s Act as guidelines for determining the pregnant child’s ‘best 
interests’ in emergency situations where there is no time to obtain 
the consent required by the Children’s Act.[11] Such an approach 
is also consistent with bioethical principles of patient autonomy, 
beneficence, non-maleficence and justice or fairness.[12]
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